


River Complex

**USDA Forest Service
Shasta-Trinity National Forest
Six Rivers National Forest**

Incident Management Summary

August 1-13, 2015



River Complex

The fires comprising the River Complex were reported at approximately 2230 hrs on Thursday, July 30th. Eighteen fires were reported to have started by lightning on both the Shasta-Trinity National Forest and Six Rivers National Forest to the northwest and southwest of Denny, CA. Due to incident complexity, threat to structures, and forecasted weather and fuel conditions, a Type 1 Incident Management Team was ordered.

California Interagency Incident Management Team #3 (CIIMT #3), Mark von Tillow, Incident Commander, was ordered on July 31st. CIIMT #3 traveled on June 31st and was in-briefed at 2000 hrs at the Shasta-Trinity National Forest Supervisor's Office. Present at the in-brief were representatives from the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, Six Rivers National Forest (by VTC), and CIIMT #3 Command and General Staff. CIIMT #3 assumed command of the River Complex at 0600 hrs on August 1st, with the 18 fires totaling approximately 1,800 acres.

The Shasta-Trinity National Forest and Six Rivers National Forest provided clear leader's intent during the briefing, in the WFDSS, and in the Delegation of Authority.



Command Objectives

August 1-13, 2015

Incident Strategy

The suppression strategy for the River Complex will utilize a combination of direct, indirect and point protection. A key element of the plan is flexibility and the ability to apply the right resource, to the right task, at the right time, for the right duration. It is understood fireline will be constructed only where it is feasible and safe to do so. It is the responsibility of the Incident Commander and their Staff to work with the Agency Administrator to ensure the plan is regularly reviewed and updated.

Leader's Expectations

- Provide the highest level of customer services to all involved with or impacted by the River Complex. All incident assigned personnel should be prepared to take the appropriate actions regarding:
 - Personal interactions both internal and external to the incident management organization
 - Personal safety and the safety of others
 - An incident-within-an-incident

Management Objectives

- Provide for firefighter and public safety by ensuring LCES is evaluated and by utilizing sound Risk Management Principles.
- Maintain and build on Cooperator, Partner, and Stakeholder relationships.
- Suppress the Complex at the smallest size, while not exposing firefighters or aircraft to unnecessary risk.
- In Wilderness, favor indirect attack by using natural barriers, topography and watercourses, and low impact, "light hand" suppression techniques.

Control Objectives

- Protect life and property in the communities of Denny, Bell Flat, Hoboken, Dailey, and Trinity from the impacts of unwanted wildfire.
- Scout western side of Complex for access and implement suppression actions to minimize spread of fire toward the Community of Hoopa.
- Develop and implement structure defense plan for the Trinity Village/Hawkins Bar area.

Command and General Staff Summaries

Command

Agency administration interaction, support, and coordination for this fire was conducted with Tina Lynsky, District Ranger, Trinity River Management Unit, Shasta-Trinity National Forest, and Nolan Colegrove, District Ranger, Lower Trinity District, Six Rivers National Forest. The team was delegated authority for the River Complex effective August 1st at 0600 hrs.

A full control strategy was implemented with emphasis on firefighter and public safety with the expressed expectation to minimize exposure and manage risk. Priority objectives were protecting communities and infrastructure in areas in and around the fire area, while maintaining and building on cooperator and stakeholder relationships.

CIIMT #3 was challenged throughout the incident by the stiff competition for resources, specifically T1 hand crews and T3 engines within the GACC due to the number of complexes around the River Complex. CIIMT #3 was able to work within those constraints and achieve reasonable objectives.

Relationships amongst the local communities, cooperators, including the Hoopa Tribe and the local Ranger Districts, were maintained and enhanced throughout the incident.

Agency administrators were readily available to assist when needed and stayed actively engaged in strategic planning for the River Complex.

Specifically, the relationship developed and maintained with the Hoopa Reservation was invaluable as far as supporting fires and resources logistically. Chief Rod Mendes was a pleasure to work with as well as was Tribal Chair Ryan Jackson.

CIIMT #3 hosted three public meetings in the community of Trinity Village, Willow Creek, and Hoopa; all were well received. CIIMT #3 also attended two other public meetings in Burnt Ranch hosted by Nor Cal Team #2 (South Complex). They were also well received.

Safety

CIIMT #3 uses a Risk Analysis process to develop the Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis (modified ICS-215a). It is through the risk analysis process the CIIMT #3's Operations and Safety

Statistics

Safety

Serious Injury (OWCP reportable)	0
Transports to Medical Facility	6
Medical Unit Visits	513
Vehicle Collision/Damage	1

Acreages

Fire Area	28,592
Shasta-Trinity National Forest	23,600
Six Rivers National Forest	4,992

Fireline

Total Fire Perimeter	115 miles
Completed Line	10 miles
Handline	3 miles
Dozerline	6 miles
Improved Roads	18 miles

Air Operations

Retardant Dropped	78,193 gallons
Water Dropped	75,210 gallons
Total Flight Time	98 hours

Resources

Crew (Type 1)	2
Crew (Type 2IA)	5
Dozer	4
Engine	54
Water Tender	9
Helicopters	3
Overhead	225
Camp Crews	4
Trainees for Incident	53
Highest Number of Personnel	644

August 11, 2015

Public Information

Board Contacts	838
Trapline Stops	21
SHF Facebook "likes"	↑56%
Community Meetings	6
Highest Facebook Reach	15,540

Data Snapshot—August 13, 2015

Sections identified and discussed the hazards and risks of the proposed strategies/tactics, and then developed a set of mitigations to bring the risk level acceptable for CIIMT #3. If risk was not able to be mitigated, the strategies were modified.

Risk Analysis Process Summary

- Hazards and risks are identified and rated for the likelihood and severity of a bad outcome pre-mitigation.
- Through conversations between Operations and Safety, mitigations are developed.
- Hazards and risks are then re-evaluated after applying the mitigations to determine the residual risk level.
- Based on the residual rating, a comparison is made to determine if the level of risk is commensurate with the values being protected.
- Incident Commander signs off on level of acceptable risk for activities being undertaken.
- The hazards and mitigations identified in the Risk Analysis were then documented on the ICS-215A.

See Appendix A for an example of the Risk Analysis/ICS-215a.

- The Medical Unit utilized the Risk Analysis, ICS-215A and had discussions with Operations and Safety to determine locations and numbers of resources to develop the Medical Plan (ICS-206). See Appendix




B for an example of the ICS-206.

- Implemented the NWCG Incident Medical Emergency Plan (MEP) guidelines. MEP was reviewed by all Command and General Staff.
 - Incident Air Medevac was available through Air National Guard based in Redding, CA. The helicopter had patient hoist/medevac and night flying capabilities.
 - There were 6 patients transported to a medical facility and 5 OWCP worker's compensation cases (1 of which was an OSHA reportable injury).
- Safety Officers were utilized to perform ICP and heliport inspections, which were documented. Very few deficiencies were noted or needed correction. Line Safety Officers observed and made recommendations on the fireline to ensure safe work practices.
 - Signification hazards/risks addressed on the incident:
 - ◊ Marijuana gardens

- ◇ Long travel times
- ◇ Evacuations and re-entry
- ◇ Narrow winding roads
- ◇ Dead snags and weakened green trees
- ◇ Steep terrain with rolling rocks and logs
- ◇ Equipment operations doing line construction, e.g., chippers, masticator, dozers
- ◇ Remote cabins and structures with limited access

Public Information

- With multiple large incidents on the Shasta-Trinity and Six Rivers National Forests, it was clear that a Joint Information Center (JIC) would be appropriate. CIIMT #3 PIO Dave Olson took the lead with forest PAOs and the NIMO PIO in establishing the JIC in Redding. The River Complex Information Center provided the JIC with two daily updates, posted texts, photos, and videos to Inciweb, and provided multiple stories each day to the JIC for social media posting. The JIC updated social media, and produced a daily summary update and compilation map of all fires on the forests which was essential for public awareness.



- Prior to the opening of the JIC, the forests had delegated the task of posting social media (Facebook and Twitter) to the teams. The plan to have the team send social posts to the JIC and to post emergency information immediately worked well. Several articles, videos, and photos were sent and posted. There was a significant spike in Facebook “likes” for the local forests.
- “Information Saturation” was an objective of the Information Section. Digital connectivity in the area was sporadic so a multi-pronged approach was implemented. The Community Branch of the Information Section hosted two community meetings and worked with adjacent teams on three others. Additionally, CIIMT #3 collaborated with Hoopa OES, presenting a meeting on the Hoopa Reservation. Traplines were established and run daily.
- When the PIOs arrived, the Shasta-Trinity National Forest PAO presented the initial arriving PIOs with the Shasta-Trinity National Forest Incident Information Plan. The document was helpful in establishing the Information Section structure and process. The document did refer to several appendices that were not

included in the package received. These would also have been helpful.

- The information plans from both forests directed the use of Mail Chimp for information distribution. This freeware product proved to be glitchy and caused delays in electronic information distribution. Alternatively, a list of email contacts provided by the forest could easily be incorporated to an e-blast on a G-Mail account.

Liaison

- The Shasta/Trinity National Forest simultaneously hosted multiple Incident Management Teams for fires and complexes in close proximity to each. As a result, Community Liaisons and Local Cooperators were shared by several incident management teams. Neighboring incident management teams shared contact lists and facilitated introductions to incoming teams.
- Daily Community Liaison/Cooperator phone calls were utilized in place of cooperator meetings, primarily due to the dangerous road conditions. This maintained the continuity of incident information sharing, coordinated issue resolution in a timely and informal manner, added to the transparency of incident operations, and provided the opportunity for daily individual communication with the Incident Command staff.

Human Resources

- The HRSP was the eyes and ears for the IC, resolving issues at the lowest level. There were 5 HR contacts, and none were civil rights violations or of a sexual harassment nature. All issues were closed.



- The HRSP increased awareness of expected behavior and conduct as well as the Department/Agency mandated regulations regarding sexual and non-sexual harassment and zero tolerance for alcohol and/or illegal drugs.
- This information was disseminated through daily briefings, IAP messages, bulletin board posters and general interaction.
- Non-perishable food was collected for the local Hoopa Tribe.

- The local Union Representative and Forest Civil Rights Officer were contacted and visited fire camp.

Operations

- On August 1st, Operations Appling, Henry, and Herrera met with District FMO Stew Richter in Weaverville and gathered intelligence from local resources on the multiple fires north of the Trinity River in the New River drainage. Richter provided a list of resources currently engaged in extended attack, several fire history maps, and contacts at the local volunteer fire departments along the 299 road corridor. Air resources were limited to one medium helicopter (H-512). Henry and Appling took a recon flight of the southwest corner only, as smoke limited visibility up the river drainage. Appling then went up the New River and to the Daily Ranch to tie in with the current Operations (Josh Wright) and gathered intelligence on the current situation. With the limited resources, Operations initially broke into three branches.

- On August 2nd, with limited resources (18 engines, 1 crew, and 2 dozers), CIIMT #3 continued with branches only. Focus was put on community defense in the Denny, Daily, and Hoboken areas. Objectives were set to address fatigue management, protect private property, manage costs, and respond to any initial attack within the Temporary Flight Restriction area. Over the next three shifts, groups were established to ensure that span of control and accountability was in place. Community defense was still the primary focal point for Operations, as no anchor point had been established amongst the numerous fires still burning within a 5 mile radius. On the afternoon of August 5th, a spot fire on the east side of the New River became established and made a run up to Big Mountain.
- On August 6th, with few resources trickling in, an anchor point was established in the southeastern corner from Hoboken Road to the New River and into the Bell Flat area. This prompted CIIMT #3 to start working on perimeter control and establishing divisions. The operational priority was to secure the anchor point and establish a western perimeter north to the 2013 Corral Fire, thus keeping the fire from impacting the



numerous communities along the 299 corridor and from moving onto the Hoopa Reservation. The spot fire across the New River grew to 100+ acres (from infrared mapping); no resources were assigned, as priority for the resources on hand remained the western flank.

- On August 8th, CIIMT #3 assigned a Division Supervisor to look at the fire across the New River; Division Q was added. Good progress continued up the east flank as well as in the Denny area. With the hazards of driving

through the burn area, Denny Spike Camp remained in place to limit the number of exposures. Over the next several shifts through a combination of direct and indirect line, crews secured approximately 60% of the western perimeter. On August 11th, crews secured the lines in Divisions A, D, and L. On August 12th, resources initiated indirect line in Division Q to the east in the French Creek road system and ridgelines.

- In summary, resources have shown great progress along the western perimeter, and good indirect planning has occurred on the eastern edge. Challenges have been the lack of resources (being 5th priority within Area Command), poor driving conditions (access and egress), and poor air conditions not conducive to use of air resources. Throughout CIIMT #3's tenure, no serious accidents or injuries have occurred. Limited resources have added to the fatigue, as crews and engines have been extending to help keep a workforce in place. CIIMT #3 has been able to replace engines as they timed out; however, crews and dozers have not been replaced with adequate frequency and timeliness to meet operational needs. Perimeter control has been established along the west and several options have been identified to the east should resources become available to do so.

- Night Operations consisted of 2 Divisions & 1 Branch. Divisions A, D, L (west) and D, O, Z (east) have a total of 13 engines. The objective for Night Operations was to maintain a presence within the communities of Denny, Daily Ranch, and Hoboken, and patrol and hold the lines in those divisions. Due to the investment in securing the west flank from the potential of rollout and to the public relations within the community of Denny, it is highly recommended that Night Operations continue.
- The Willow Creek Helibase was established at the old airstrip in Willow Creek. The helibase supported (1) Type 1, (1) Type 2, and (1) Type 3 helicopter. Air Attacks were all based in Redding.
- The National Guard Medevac aircraft with NVG/Night Hoist capability was staged in Redding to cover the fires in the region.
- Due to extremely active regionwide fire activity, needed aerial resources were unavailable.
- Poor visibility from smoke made it difficult for helicopters to support the incidents; helicopters were able to fly only 5 of the 14 days CIIMT #3 was assigned.

Logistics

- Veteran's Park was utilized for Base Camp and ICP, with additional land use agreements having been set up for equipment parking and Ground Support on neighboring properties. Use of the VFW Hall for ICP functions worked well in the interim until adequate trailer and tent space arrived.
- Initial camp setup was challenged by the inability to get resources due to numerous complexes in the area and the lack of available resources.
- Camp Security was challenged by illegal drug harvesters gaining entry to forest closure areas, treacherous road conditions, and Base Camp parking control. This was overcome by a large security force, traffic control patterns, and roving patrols.
- The Supply Unit found that significant delays occurred on orders being placed into ROSS due to the large number of fires in the area and local purchase supplies having limited stock in Eureka, CA. Alternative sources were found using mail order to fill local area purchase orders.
- Day sleeping was set up through local agreements at the VFW Hall and a local vacant store front.
- Incident Communications was served by two command repeaters which provide adequate coverage for the incident.
- Denny Spike Camp was set up and served approximately 120 personnel. Food for the Spike Camp was limited to MREs and sack lunches due to the poor road conditions and travel times which push the limits on the ability to provide hot food.
- The Medical Unit was located at ICP, with a




second Medical Unit Leader located at Denny Spike Camp. Two REM (Rapid Extraction Modules) working for the Medical Unit provided coverage to the fire to help mitigate concerns of crews working in steep terrain.

Finance

- Finance personnel interfaced with two forests and local officials to determine and address their needs related to Incident Business for the River Complex.
- Finance prepared payments to contractors and fire departments and processed personnel time using the standards of the Interagency Incident Business Management Handbook.
- Personnel successfully implemented contract provisions for five Incident-Only Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements (EERAs): tents, solar light towers and office trailer, transport and skidgine for Denny, generators and road clearing, and forklift.
- There were nine Land Use Agreements completed while CIIMT #3 was in command.
- 112 equipment packages were processed on this incident.
- Extended shifts were monitored and necessary for several shifts due to fire activity, threats to structures, and long travel times. These were mitigated as soon as was able, and documented, with IC approvals.
- Cost of resources and personnel were tracked in e-ISuite. The total cost of the River Complex as of August 13th at 0900 hrs is:

Resource	Amount
Aircraft	965,252
Equipment	2,683,244
Crews	737,489
Camp Personnel	1,637,198
Line Personnel	607,435
Camp Support	2,482,066
TOTAL	\$9,112,922

Group Category Summary Report by Incident
Incident: RIVER COMPLEX (US-CA-SHF-002066)



- Average daily cost for the River Complex was approximately \$650,000.00 per day. Highest cost per day was \$985,000.00 on August 8th.
- One notable success was the ability to fully staff all Finance functions quickly with competent, fully qualified personnel.
- Another noticeable success was securing and testing the new R5 Satellite Internet Service contract.
- A significant challenge was this year's new hiring practices and documentation requirements for ADs and out-of-state employees who were assigned as ADs on this incident. This resulted in inaccurate accrual reports until their ROSS data was corrected and caused additional work in the Time Unit, tracking down correct casual hire information.

Planning

- Briefings were conducted at 0700 hrs and 1900 hrs each day. From August 1-6th, the night shift briefing was done via radio; in-person night shift briefings started on August 7th at ICP.
- The Lightning Ridge Technologies copy service arrived the evening of August 1st and reproduced an IAP on the evening of August 2nd. The August 1st IAP was reproduced at the Willow Creek District office on the Six Rivers National Forest. Operational Briefing, Progression, and Ownership maps are in Appendix C.
- The ICS-209 was completed twice daily by the Planning Section by 0600 hrs and 1800 hrs.
- The VFW in Kimtu Park was utilized for the Resource Unit, Demob Unit, Documentation Unit, and Situation Unit for the first three days. Challenges included inadequate space for entire Section and the far proximity of the copy trailer to the Planning Section. This was mitigated upon the arrival of additional trailers and yurts.
- Lack of internet service for the first 10 days was problematic for both the Resource Unit and Situation Unit; personnel utilized personal wifi devices in order to function.
- The PSC2 trainee performed Training Specialist duties until the position was filled on August 10th. The Training Specialist made individual contacts on an as needed basis. There were a total of 53 trainees, with 5 being regional priority trainees. CIIMT #3 had 9 trainees; 5 individuals were considered for certification. There were 25 Forest Service, 1 BIA, 19 local government, and 8 state/other trainees.
- This was the first time CIIMT #3 used e-ISuite on an incident; for the most part, the program worked as expected, and the RESLs encountered minimal errors or glitches in the program.
- The Planning Section established cooperative working relationships with the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, the Six Rivers National Forest, and the Hoopa Reservation; this helped immensely in producing maps and providing internet access to the Situation Unit.

Fire Weather Summary

The River Complex was several lightning fires that started on the evening of Thursday July 30th. The weather leading up to the lightning was characterized by unseasonably hot weather for the three days prior to the lightning event. For example, Redding broke a record high with 114 degrees on July 30th and Sacramento 108 degrees. Locally, on July 28th, Willow Creek was 101degrees with a low of 53 degrees. On the day of the ignition, Willow Creek had a high of 109 degrees and a low of 58 degrees. The lightning storm initiated during the late afternoon and evening of July 30th. The monsoon moisture initially started over the southern Sierra and then made its way northward towards Tahoe. The moisture then transferred over the Central Valley and storms erupted over the coastal range including much of Trinity County. Under these conditions, the lightning ignition efficiency was very high with dry fine fuel moisture and very hot fuel temperatures. In this environment, the fires were able to immediately burn actively through the first night.

As the sun came up on Friday July 31st, the heat wave continued with both Willow Creek and Orleans reporting high temperatures of 107 degrees (Weaverville was 106 degrees). The hot weather continued right through Saturday August 1st with a high of 100 degrees at Willow Creek. Cooling would finally develop by Sunday, Aug 2nd with a high of 82 degrees reported at Willow Creek.

After the initial ignition and hot conditions, the driving factor with the fire spread was fuels and slope. Weather conditions were fairly benign for much of the week of August 3rd through 9th. By Monday, August 10th, an upper low approached with some increasing southerly winds that prompted Red Flag Warnings through Tuesday, August 11th. The low then brought higher humidity and cooler temperatures over the complex through Thursday, August 13th. The long range forecast calls for a warming and drying trend through the weekend of Aug 15-16th.

Fire Behavior Summary



Fire behavior at the time CIIMT #3 assumed management of the River Complex is best described as fuels and topography dominated. The fire was mainly in a backing alignment and primary fire spread was active backing and flanking fire through heavy dead and down fuels. The Energy Release Component (ERC) from the nearby NFDERS station (Brush Mountain) was in the 90-95th percentile. All fuels—both live and dead—were available to burn. Observed flame lengths were 1-6 feet in timber Fire Behavior Fuel Model (TU-5) and 2-8 feet in snow brush (SH-9). The fires totaled approximately 1,800 acres when CIIMT #3 assumed command and grew approximately 2,000 acres each day CIIMT #3 managed the fires.

Fire behavior on the River Complex was significantly affected by other fires in the area. Smoke from other fires shaded the complex which moderated fire behavior. For example, very little torching was observed unless the fuels were in direct sunlight.

The fire experienced one day of high winds and Haines 6 conditions, low humidity, and unstable atmosphere; fire growth on this day was approximately 2,000 acres.

Appendix A
Risk Analysis/ICS-215a

Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis		Operational Period: August 6 Day/Night Shift		Incident: River Complex			
Identification of Hazards and Risk Assessment		Assignment: Full Suppression		Mission Objective(s): Provide for emergency personnel and public safety, attention to work/rest ratio & travel times. Take appropriate suppression action on all fires.			
Pre-mitigation - Base Level Risk		Division/Group/ Branch Location		Post-mitigation - Residual Risk			
Actions, Hazards, Mission	Likelihood of Bad Outcome	Severity	Risk Level	Likelihood of Bad Outcome	Severity	Residual Risk Level	Risk vs. Gain - Risk Acceptable? Yes/No
Marijuana Gardens	Remote	Critical	Medium	BR 1	X	Improbable	Yes
Insects	Occasional	Catastrophic	High	Denny Grp	X	Remote	Yes
Bears/Wildlife	Remote	Critical	Medium	Ridge Grp	X	Improbable	Yes
Poison oak	Frequent	Critical	Medium	Trinity Grp	X	Remote	Yes
Road Conditions	Frequent	Catastrophic	High	Hawkins G	X	Remote	Yes
Vehicle Travel	Frequent	Catastrophic	High	Salyer Grp	X	Remote	Yes
Communications	Frequent	Catastrophic	High	Staging	X	Remote	Yes
Hazard Trees	Frequent	Catastrophic	High			Remote	Yes
Rolling Material	Frequent	Catastrophic	High			Remote	Yes
Structures	Probable	Catastrophic	High			Occasional	Yes
Direct Attack	Probable	Catastrophic	High			Remote	Yes
Indirect Attack	Probable	Catastrophic	High			Remote	Yes
Operations Section Chief	/s/Mike Appling	Date / Time:	8/05/15 1600	Safety Officer	/s/ Ron Bertsch/Larry Wright	Date / Time:	08/05/15; 1600

ICCS 215A
 Risk Level
 High
 Medium
 Low

Likelihood/Probability:
 Frequent-Individual - Likely to occur often
 All Resources - Continuously experienced
 Probable- Individual - Will occur several times
 All Resources - Will occur often
 Occasional-Individual - Likely to occur sometime
 All Resources - Will occur several times
 Remote-Individual - Unlikely to occur, but possible
 All Resources - Unlikely but can reasonably be expected to occur
 Probable-Individual - So unlikely, it can be assumed it will not occur
 All Resources - Unlikely to occur, but possible

Severity/Consequences
 Catastrophe- Results in fatality/fatalities and/or loss of system
 Critical- Severe injury and/or major system damage
 Marginal- Minor injury and/or minor system damage
 Negligible- Less than minor injury/or less than minor damage

Appendix B

ICS-206

MEDICAL PLAN	1. INCIDENT NAME River Complex	2. DATE PREPARED 8-12-15	3. TIME PREPARED 1845 hrs	4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD 8/13/15		
5. INCIDENT MEDICAL AID STATIONS						
MEDICAL AID STATIONS		LOCATION		PARAMEDICS YES NO		
Willow Creek ICP		Base – Med Tent, next to the playground.		XX		
(REM-1) HENZGEN (Lead) & EMTP GREGOR		Division "A" or as directed by Division Supervisor		XX		
EMTP Sitar		Division "D" or as directed by Division Supervisor		XX		
EMT Schroder		Division "O" or as directed by Division Supervisor		XX		
EMTP Estrada & EMT Elledge		Division "L" or as directed by Division Supervisor		XX		
MEDL Hazlett		Division "Q" DP14 or as Directed By Division Supervisor		XX		
6. TRANSPORTATION						
A. AMBULANCE SERVICES						
NAME		ADDRESS	PHONE	PARAMEDICS YES NO		
Trinity County Life Support, 301, 302		909 Main St. Weaverville	530 623 2500	XX		
Trinity County Life Support 303 (third up)		Hay Fork	530 623 2500	XX		
Hoopa Ambulance Service		Willow Creek	530 625 4180	XX		
Hoopa Ambulance Service		Hoopa	530 625 4180	XX		
B. INCIDENT AMBULANCES						
NAME		LOCATION		PARAMEDIC YES NO		
Arcata Ambulance		Staged at DP1 during day operations		XX		
7. HOSPITALS						
NAME	ADDRESS	TRAVEL TIME		PHONE	HELIPAD	BURN CENTER
		AIR	GRND			
Mad River Hospital	3800 Janes Rd, Arcata, CA	20 min	1 h	707 826-8264	XX	XX
Mercy Medical Center	2175 Rosaline Ave, Redding	1 h	2.5 h	530 225-7201	XX	XX
St. Joseph's Hospital	2700 Dolbeer St, Eureka	30 min	2 h	707-445-8121	XX	XX
UCD Medical Center	2315 Stockton Blvd, Sac.	2 h	5 h	916 734 2011	XX	XX
8. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES						
IN-CAMP CARE				LINE EMERGENCIES		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor Injuries or illnesses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek Aid directly at the ICP Medical Unit Unit Open 0600 hrs to 2200 hrs Moderate to Severe Injuries or Illnesses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contact Communications or Med Unit directly Med Unit staffed after hours for Emergencies Workers Comp Reporting & Prescription Refills <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0730 hrs to 2100 hrs MEDL Available by phone (916) 215- 2732 MEDL will be available on Logistics Net 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Announce "Medical Emergency" on Cmd, Ch. 1 or 2 Identify on Scene Command <p style="text-align: center;">Notify Division Supervisor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Give your unit name and advise what EMTs are on scene. Give your location and Lat/ Log if possible Give the nature of the medical problem Give Number of Injured and Severity Request line Medic Response. Request type of evacuation resources needed: Ground Support, Ambulance, REM <p style="text-align: center;">For Air Evacuations the following additional information will be needed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Give Lat / Long, Ground Contact, Describe the terrain, elevation, and Temp, if possible 		
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>NON-Emergency Pre-planning</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start of shift: notify your Div Sup of EMT's and Equipment you have available for response if needed. 						
ICS 206 8-78	9. PREPARED BY (MEDICAL UNIT LEADER) Scott McKenney MEDL & Shawn Lenske, MEDL-(t)			10. REVIEWED BY (SAFETY OFFICER) Larry Wright SOF1(t)		

The Rapid Extraction Module has been assigned to this incident to provide for firefighter ground evacuation in the event that air evacuation is not possible.

The north state forests provide challenges which can only be overcome with planning and resources. Redundancy is the key to success in any rescue operations. To provide the timeliest response, the concept of the Rapid Extraction Module has been developed. The intent is to stage this team with equipment at critical access points during firefighting operations.



Mountain Fire 2013, Div Q

As of 8-04-14, we have the personnel and basic equipment to staff one "REM". The radio call sign will be "REM1" and will be staged as determined by Operations.

Intended Use:

The Rapid Evacuation Module will responded to all line medical emergencies. If rescue by other means is deployed as soon as that option has been successful the REM will be returned to service.



Staffing:

The REM will be staffed with 4 personnel to move equipment to the rescue site and then provided technical assistance in packaging and movement of the patient to the designated rendezvous point for ambulance or ground support transportation for follow up medical care.


Equipment:

- Litter with Wheel
- Backboard
- Cervical Collar
- Webbing, and hardware to build systems anchor, lowering, and Mechanical Advantage.
- Sleeping Pads
- Sleeping bag
- Rescue ropes 200' of 1/2"
- utility line 1/2"
- SKED

Appendix C
Operational Briefing, Progression, and Ownership Maps



River Complex Fire Progression Map



River Complex SRF - SHF

August 13, 2015

